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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1449 
___________ 
 
JEFFREY TARRATS, 
              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN ALLENWOOD FCI 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4-17-cv-00432) 
District Judge:  Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 28, 2019 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., RESTREPO and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 29, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jeffrey Tarrats appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, which he filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  We will affirm. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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I. 
 In 2004, Tarrats pleaded guilty to drug charges in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Virginia.  That court sentenced Tarrats as a “career offender” 
under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 to 262 months in prison.  In doing so, the court relied on 
Tarrats’s three prior convictions of possessing with the intent to distribute controlled 
substances in violation of Va. Code § 18.2-248 (two of which involved cocaine).   
Tarrats appealed, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal on 
the basis of an appellate waiver contained in his plea agreement.  See United States v. 
Linder, 174 F. App’x 174, 175-76 (4th Cir. 2006).  Tarrats has since unsuccessfully 
challenged his sentence on numerous occasions, including in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255 with his sentencing court, see United States v. Tarrats, 251 F. App’x 256, 257 (4th 
Cir. 2007), and in a § 2241 petition with his court of confinement in this Circuit, see 
Tarrats v. Warden Allenwood USP, 592 F. App’x 52, 53-54 (3d Cir. 2014). 
At issue here is another § 2241 petition that Tarrats filed in his court of 
confinement.  This time, Tarrats argued that, under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2243 (2016), his convictions under Va. Code § 18.2-248 do not qualify as “controlled 
substance offenses” as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).  The District Court dismissed 
Tarrats’s petition on the ground that his claim was not cognizable under § 2241 and the 
theory that we recognized in In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997), because he 
challenged only his sentencing designation as a career criminal and not his convictions  
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for his underlying crimes.  Tarrats appeals.1 
II. 
 The parties dispute whether federal prisoners can challenge career-offender 
designations under § 2241 and the theory that we recognized in Dorsainvil.  We have not 
decided that question, see United States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2015), and 
we need not do so in this case because we agree with the Government’s alternative 
argument that Tarrats’s claim lacks merit.  See Shepherd v. Krueger, — F.3d —, No. 17-
1362, 2018 WL 6787294, at *1 (7th Cir. Dec. 26, 2018) (electing to “bypass . . . 
procedural hurdles” regarding a Mathis-based § 2241 petition where the petition “can be 
resolved most simply on the merits”). 
 Tarrats claims that his convictions under Va. Code § 18.2-248 do not qualify as 
“controlled substance offenses” as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).  In particular, Tarrats 
argues that the Virginia statute is broader than § 4B1.2(b) and that a conviction under the 
Virginia statute thus does not qualify under the strict categorical approach first required 
by Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).  Tarrats further argues that, under 
Mathis, convictions under the Virginia statute must be assessed by that strict categorical 
approach rather than the modified categorical approach because the Virginia statute is not  
 
1 Federal prisoners do not require a certificate of appealability to appeal the dismissal of a 
§ 2241 petition.  See Reese v. Warden Phila. FDC, 904 F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir. 2018).  
Thus, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may affirm for any reason 
supported by the record.  See Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 102 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
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divisible. 
This claim lacks merit because, regardless of whether convictions under the 
Virginia statute are assessed under the categorical approach or the modified categorical 
approach, Tarrats has not shown that the Virginia statute is broader than § 4B1.2(b) in 
any way.  The relevant provisions of the statute and Guidelines definition are set forth in 
the margin.2 
Tarrats argued below that the Virginia statute is broader than the Guidelines 
definition in two respects.  First, he argued that the Virginia statute criminalizes 
possession with intent to “give,” Va. Code § 18.2-248(A), while § 4B1.2(b) does not use 
that word and instead requires possession with intent to “distribute or dispense.”  Tarrats 
has not repeated that argument in arguing the merits of his claim on appeal, so we could 
deem it waived.   
In any event, Tarrats has raised nothing suggesting that the Virginia statute’s use 
of the word “give” is broader than § 4B1.2(b)’s use of the word “distribute.”  Courts 
interpreting the term “distribute” as used in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) have recognized that 
“drugs may be distributed by giving them away for free.”  United States v. Bobadilla-
Pagán, 747 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Cortés-Cabán, 691 F.3d 
 
2 Section 4B1.2(b) defines as a controlled substance offense “an offense under federal or 
state law . . . that prohibits . . . the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to 
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.”  The Virginia statute in turn makes 
it “unlawful for any person to . . . possess with intent to manufacture, sell, give or 
distribute a controlled substance[.]”  Va. Code § 18.2-248(A).   
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1, 19 (1st Cir. 2012), and citing, inter alia, United States v. Washington, 41 F.3d 917, 919 
(4th Cir. 1994)).  Tarrats has not addressed this point, let alone raised anything 
suggesting that the term “distribute” as used in § 4B1.2(b) should be interpreted any 
differently. 
 Second, Tarrats relied on another section of the Virginia statute providing for a 
reduced sentence if the defendant is able to prove that he or she acted “only as an 
accommodation to another individual.”  Va. Code. § 18.2-248(D).  Thus, he argued that 
the Virginia statute is broader than § 4B1.2(b) because he could have violated the 
Virginia statute merely by making an “accommodation” to another.   
“According to Virginia case law,” however, “§ 18.2-248(D) is relevant only to 
sentencing and allows the defendant to mitigate his punishment; it does not change the 
offense, which remains distribution regardless of whether an accommodation is 
involved.”  United States v. Rodriguez, 523 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2008) (collecting 
Virginia cases in addressing a challenge to the application of a different Sentencing 
Guideline).  Thus, even if the Virginia statute can be violated by giving drugs away for 
free or otherwise distributing them merely as an accommodation, the Virginia statute still 
requires an intent to distribute just as § 4B1.2(b) does.   
In sum, Tarrats has raised nothing suggesting that the Virginia statute is broader 
than § 4B1.2(b) in any way.  Thus, even if Mathis requires application of the strict 
categorical approach to convictions under the Virginia statute (which we do not decide), 
Tarrats has not shown that a conviction under that statute no longer qualifies as a  
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controlled substance offense as defined in § 4B1.2(b). 
III. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
